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Abstract. For portable communication systems, the delegation-based authentication protocol provides effi-
cient subsequent login authentication, data confidentiality, user privacy protection, and non-repudiation.  
However, in all proposed protocols, the non-repudiation of mobile users is based on an unreasonable assump-
tion that home location registers are always trusted.  To weaken this assumption and enhance the non-
repudiation of mobile users, a new delegation-based authentication protocol is proposed.  The new protocol 
also removes the exhaustive search problem of the subsequent login authentication to improve the subsequent 
login authentication performance.  Moreover, the user unlinkability in the subsequent login authentication is 
also provided to enhance the user identity privacy protection.  
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1   Introduction 
Portable communication systems (PCSs) provide roaming services among wireless communication networks.  A 
mobile user (MU) first registers his/her legality in some home location register (HLR).  Before roaming, MU 
logins some visiting location register (VLR) and VLR validates the user’s legality with the help of the HLR.  If 
MU is legal of some HLR, VLR provides services and charges the roaming fee. 
The global system for mobile communications (GSM) has some drawbacks [1]: No non-repudiation property, 
no users’ identity privacy, and no mutual authentication between users and VLR.  Some symmetric-
cryptosystem-based protocols [2, 3] try to improve the GSM protocol, but they cannot achieve non-repudiation 
property.  Some public-key-cryptosystem-based protocols are proposed [4, 5] to provide both non-repudiation 
and mutual authentication services by paying heavy computation cost. 
For PCSs, Lee and Yeh [1] first proposed the delegation-based authentication protocol that exhibits off-line 
authentication processes to reduce the communication load between VLR and HLR; and mobile users’ computa-
tion cost.  Though their protocol satisfies the mutual authentication, data secrecy, and identity privacy, the pro-
tocol does not satisfy the non-repudiation property in off-line authentication processes [6] during roaming ser-
vices.  To overcome this flaw, Lee proposed an enhanced protocol.  Unfortunately, Lee’s protocol suffers the 
linkable problem [7-8] that two distinct roaming instances belonging to the same MU can be linked by the same 
MU’s identity.  To remove the linkable problem, Youn and Lim’s [7], and Wang et al.’s [8] protocols are pro-
posed.  However, Wang et al.’s protocol suffers forgery attack [9].  Both those two protocols also suffer the 
exhausted search problem in off-line authentication [10].  To overcome the exhaustive search problem, Chen et 
al. [10] proposed their improvement. 
In the proposed delegation-based authentication protocols [1, 6-8, 10], HLR knows any authorized MU’s 
proxy public key and proxy private key.  MU’s proxy private key is used to generate the proxy signatures for 
non-repudiation property.  To avoid misusing of the proxy public and private key pair and to provide MUs’ non-
repudiation, HLR must be always trustworthy. 
However, it is hard to guarantee that the HLR is always trustworthy, because some staffs of the HLR may be 
malicious.  After stealing the proxy private keys, the malicious staffs easily forge the proxy signatures for some 
mobile user for roaming.  Then the mobile user owning the stolen proxy private key cannot deny the roaming 
records caused by the malicious staffs.  So the trust HLR assumption weakens the mobile users’ non-repudiation. 
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1.1   Our Contribution 
The mobile users’ non-repudiation is enhanced by reducing the trust HLR assumption to semi-trust HLR as-
sumption that HLR does not know the proxy private key of any MU.  So our new delegation-based authentica-
tion protocol for PCSs is proposed by adopting the concept of Hwang and Sung confidential deniable authenti-
cation protocol [10] to design our concurrent signcryption scheme for mobile users’ anonymity.  In our concur-
rent signcryption scheme, an initial signer and a matching signer exchange their signatures in a fair and confi-
dential way.  So the concurrent signcryption scheme satisfies the following security properties [11, 12]. 
Unlinkability: It is computationally infeasible to find the link between the initial signer’s and the matching 
signer’s signatures belonging to the same exchange, even though many initial signer’s and match signer’s 
signatures/signcryptexts are collected. 
Correctness: The initial signer obtains the match signer’s signature and the match signer obtains the initial 
signer’s signature if they honestly perform the concurrent signcryption scheme. 
Fairness: After finishing the concurrent signcryption scheme, only the two cases occur.  One case is that both 
initial signer and matching signer obtain the match signer’s signature and the initial signer’s signature, re-
spectively.  One case is that no one obtains the signatures. 
Unforgeability: Neither the initial signer’s signatures nor matching signer’s signatures can be forged, even 
though the forger is initial signer or matching signer. 
Confidentiality: The exchanging signcryptexts are indistinguishably secure against adaptively chosen cipher-
text attacks (IND-CCA2). 
Our concurrent signcryption scheme is embedded in our delegation-based authentication protocol.  The con-
current signcryption scheme is used to fairly exchange the mobile user’s signature on the proxy public key ap-
plication and the HLR’s signature on the proxy public key delegation warrants.  Our new delegation-based au-
thentication protocol satisfies the following security properties [1, 6-8,10]. 
Non-repudiation: HLR cannot repudiate its authorization of MUs and the MU cannot repudiate its roaming 
services usage. 
Mutual authentication: During roaming services, the delegation authentication protocol provides the mutual 
authentication between HLR and VLR, VLR and MU, and HLR and MU. 
Session key security: During roaming services, the secret session keys between VLR and MU are secure. 
User identity privacy: During roaming services, no one can find out MU’s real identity except HLR. 
User unlinkability: It is hard to classify the roaming requests into groups such that the roaming requests in the 
same group belong to the same MU, even though the roaming requests are collected from different VLRs.  
The user unlinkability is divided into the login and subsequent login user unlinkability.  The login user un-
linkability means that only the beginning roaming requests for the first roaming in the VLR are considered.  
The subsequent login user unlinkability means that not only the beginning roaming requests but also the con-
tinuing roaming requests are considered. 
No exhausted search: After receiving the roaming request from some anonymous MU, the VLR easily find the 
session key for the anonymous MU during the subsequent login authentication without exhaust search. 
In the next section, the confidential deniable authentication protocol [11] is reviewed.  Our new delegation-
based authentication protocol is described in Section 3.  The security analysis of our protocol is given in Section 
4.  Section 5 gives the security property comparison and discussions among Youn and Lim, Chen et al., and our 
protocols.  The final section is our conclusions. 
 
2   Review of Hwang and Sung’s Confidential Deniable Authentication Protocol 
Hwang and Sung confidential deniable authentication protocol [11] is reviewed in Section 2.1.  Then the deci-
sion Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem and DDH assumption are described in Section 2.2. 
2.1   Hwang and Sung’s Confidential Deniable Authentication Protocol 
The protocol consists of the setup, promised-signcryption, and promise-unsigncryption phases.  In the setup 
phase, the system parameters and public functions are published.  Public parameters p and q are two large 
primes with q|(p-1) according to the security level parameter l.  The public parameter g is an element in Zp* with 
order q.  The public symmetric-key encryption is Ek(m) and the decryption function is Dk(m), where m is the 
message and k is the session key.  Two public one-way hash functions are H1(.) mapping from {0,1}* to Zq* and 
H2(.) mapping from {0,1}* to {0,1}l.  The i’s private key and public key pair is (xi, yi= gxi mod p), where xi is 
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randomly chosen from Zq*.  Here and after, the notations p and q denote two large primes with q|(p-1) and the 
notation g denotes the element in Zp* with order q. 
In the promised-signcryption phase, suppose that the sender A generates the promised signcryptext on the 
message m to the receiver B by the following steps. 
Step 1: Choose two random numbers R and k in Zq*. 
Step 2: Compute V= H1(gk mod p||m||R||yB), s= k+ VxA mod q, S= gs mod p, and K= H2((yB)s mod p). 
Step 3: Generate the ciphertext C= EK(m||R) and transmit the promise signcryptext (C, V, S) to the receiver B. 
In the promise-unsigncryption phase, B decrypts and verifies the promised signcryptext. 
Step 1: Compute K= H2(SxB mod p). 
Step 2: Decrypt C to get the message m and the random number R. 
Step 3: Verify whether or not V= H1(SyA-V mod p||m||R||yB).  If the equation holds, B is convinced that the mes-
sage m is sent from the sender A. 
2.2 Underlying Security Assumptions 
Our protocol adopts some underlying security assumptions.  One is the symmetric encryption/decryption scheme 
is IND-CCA2.  One is the DDH assumption that no probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm solves the 
following DDH problem with non-negligible probability. 
Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem 
Given the DDH instance (ga mod p, gb mod p, gc mod p), to determine whether gab ≡ gc (mod p), where a, b, 
and c are secret numbers in Zq*. 
3 Our Delegation-Based Authentication Protocol with Unlinkability and Users’ Non-
repudiation for Portable Communication Systems 
Some system parameters and public functions are constructed first.  The parameter l is a security level parameter.  
The public parameters p and q are two large primes with q|(p-1).  The public parameter g is an element in Zp* 
with order q.  Two one-way hash functions h() and H() are published, where h(.) maps from {0, 1}* to Zq* and 
H(.) maps from {0, 1}* to {0, 1}l.  Our protocol also publishes a symmetric cipher [M]K satisfying IND-CCA2, 
where M is a message and K is the symmetric secret key.  In our scheme, some public key based signature 
scheme is also published for all legal mobile users.  Notation A= Sig[M]x denotes the signature generation func-
tion and Verify[A, M]y is the signature verification function, where M is the message, A is the signature on the 
message M, x is the signer's private key, and y is the signer's public key.  Notation KVH denotes the shared secret 
key between VLR and HLR.  Notations IDV and IDH denote the identities of VLR and HLR, respectively.  Nota-
tion m1||m2 denotes the message m1 is concatenated with the message m2.  Notation A→B: M denotes that the 
user A sends the message M to the user B.  Notations (xM, yM= gxM mod p) and (xH, yH= gxH mod p) denote the 
certificated private-public key pair of MU and HLR, respectively. 
Our protocol contains three phases: Initialization, login authentication, and subsequent login authentication 
phases. 
Initialization Phase 
A mobile user MU submits his/her anonymous private-public key pair to the HLR for the first registration. 
Step 1: MU constructs an anonymous proxy private-public key pair (xK, yK= gxK mod p), where the a proxy 
private key xK∈Zq* is a random integer.  
Step 2: MU generates the promise of Schnorr signature σM on the registration for (xK, yK). 
Step 2.1: Select a random number rM∈ Zq*. 
Step 2.2: Compute VM= h(grM mod p, mM||IDM||yK), the keystone sM= rM+ VMxM mod q, and SM= gsM mod p(= 
grM+VMxM mod p), where mM is the registration document for the proxy private-public key pair (xK, 
yK). 
Step 2.3: Store σM= (SM, VM) and sM in MU’s database. 
Step 3: MU transmits HLR (σM, mM||IDM||yK) through secure channels. 
Step 4: HLR verifies the promise σM by checking whether or not VM= h(SMyM-VM mod p, mM||IDM||yK).  If the 
equation does not hold, then stop.   
Step 5: HLR generates the promise of Schnorr-like signature σH. 
Step 5.1: Select a random number rH∈Zq*. 
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Step 5.2: Compute SH= SMxH mod p, VH= h(grHSH mod p, mH||IDH||yK), k= (rH- VH)xH-1 mod q, where mH is the 
anonymous authorization warrant on (xK, yK). 
Step 5.3: Store (σH= (SH, k, VH), σM, mH, mM, IDM, yK) in HLR’s database sorted by yK.  
Step 6: HLR transmits (σH, mH ) to MU through secure channels. 
Step 7: MU validates σH by checking whether or not VH= h(gVHyHkSH mod p, mH||IDH||yK).  If the equation does 
not hold, then stop.   
Step 8: MU sets his/her proxy private key as xK and his/her proxy public key as yK. 
Step 9: MU computes HLR's Schnorr-like signature ρH= (sH= sM+k mod q, VH). 
When ρH= (sH, VH) is used, HLR easily recovers MU’s Schnorr signature ρM= (sM= sH-k mod q, VM). 
Login Authentication Phase 
MU contracts VLR to obtain roaming services, and VLR checks the MU’s legality by the following login au-
thentication protocol.  Suppose that MU’s current unused proxy public key is yK. 
Step 1: MU randomly selects an integer n1 and computes a one-way hash chain h1(n1) = h(n1), h2(n1), h3(n1), …, 
h(n+1)(n1)(= N1), where hi+1(n1)= h(hi(n1)) for n≥ i≥ 1. 
Step 2: MU constructs a new anonymous private-public key (xk,new, yk,new) for the next round by selecting a 
random number xK,new∈Zq* and computing yK,new= gxK,new mod p. 
Step 3:  MU generates the promise of Schnorr signature for (xk,new, yk,new). 
Step 3.1: Select a random number rM'∈Zq*. 
Step 3.2: Compute VM'= h(grM' mod p, mM||IDM||yK,new), the keystone sM'= rM'+ VM'xM mod q, and SM'= gsM' 
mod p= grM'+VM'xM mod p, where mM is the registration document for (xK,new, yK,new). 
Step 3.3: Store σM'= (SM', VM') and sM' in its database 
Step 4: MU generates the promise of signcrytext. 
Step 4.1: Select a random number x∈Zq*. 
Step 4.2: Compute Y= gx mod p, SK= H(SM' ||(yH)sM' mod p), and MK= H(SK). 
Step 4.3: Generate a MAC= H(MK, mM||Y||IDV||IDM||VM'||yK,new) and ciphertext CM= 
[mM||Y||IDV||IDM||VM'||yK,new||MAC]SK. 
Step 5: MU transmits (ρH= (sH, VH)= (sM+ k mod q, VH), mH, IDH, yK) to VLR. 
Step 6: VLR verifies ρH by checking whether or not VH= h(gVHyHsH mod p, mH||IDH||yK).  If the equation does 
not hold, then stop.   
Step 7: VLR selects a random number n2 and transmits MS the n2, the period of validity Per, and IDV. 
Step 8: MU generates the signature A= Sig[N1||n2||Per||IDV]xK and sends (A, (CM, SM'), IDV, N1) to VLR. 
Step 9: VLR validates the signature A on N1||n2||Per||IDV. 
Step 9.1: If Verify[A, N1||n2||Per||IDV]yK is “valid”, generate the ciphertext 
[A||Per||N1||n2||yK||(CM,SM')||ρH||Dig]KHV, where Dig= H(A||Per||N1||n2||yK||(CM,SM')||ρH). 
Step 9.2: Transmit ([A||Per||N1||n2||yK||(CM,SM')||ρH||Dig]KHV, IDH, IDV ) to HLR. 
Step 10: HLR decrypts the ciphertext [A||Per||N1||n2||yK||(CM,SM')||ρH||Dig]KHV. 
Step 10.1: Obtain (A||Per||N1||n2||yK||(CM,SM')||ρH||Dig) by decrypting 
[A||Per||N1||n2||yK||(CM,SM')||ρH||Dig]KHV. 
Step 10.2:Validate the recovered message by checking whether or not Dig= H(A||Per||N1||n2||yK||(CM,SM')||ρH). 
Step 11: HLR validates the certificate ρH of MU’s anonymous public key yk. 
Step 11.1: Find σH= (SH, k, VH) and σM= (SM, VM) in HLR’s database using yK as the searching key. 
Step 11.2: Recover the MU’s signature ρM= (sM= sH-k mod q, VM). 
Step 11.3: Verify ρM by checking whether or not VM= h(gsMyM-VM mod p, mM||IDM||yK).  If ρM is valid, HLR is 
convinced that MU is legal. 
Step 11.4: Validate the signature A by checking Verify[A, N1||n2||Per||IDV]yK to confirm the specified MU is 
the one knowing the private key xK. 
Step 12: HLR validates MU’s promise of the Schnorr signature using yk, new. 
Step 12.1: Compute SH'= SM'xH mod p and SK= H(SM||SH' mod p). 
Step 12.2: Obtain mM||Y||IDV||IDM||VM'||yK,new||h(MK, mM||Y||IDV||IDM||VM'||yK,new) by decrypting CM with the 
session key SK. 
Step 12.3: Compute MK=H(SK) then check h(MK, mM||Y||IDV||IDM||VM'||yK,new)  to authenticate message. 
Step 12.4: Check IDV. 
Step 12.5: Validate the promise (SM', VM') by checking whether or not VM'= h(SM'yK-VM' mod p, mM||IDM||yK,new). 
Step 13: HLR generates the response 
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Step 13.1: Select two random numbers rH' and R'. 
Step 13.2: Compute VH'= h(grH'SM'xH mod p, mH||IDH||yK,new) and k'= (rH'- VH')xH-1 mod q.  So the new promise 
of the certificate is σH'= (SH', k', VH')  
Step 13.3: Compute SK'=H(YxH mod p ).  
Step 13.4: Choose a nonce n3. 
Step 13.5: Compute RK1=H(N1||n2||n3||yK) and store L= N1. 
Step 13.6: Generate and transmit ([[N1||n3||IDV||R'||σH']SK'||yK||n2||N1||RK1]KHV, IDH, IDV) to VLR. 
Step 14: VLR validates HLR’s response. 
Step 14.1: Obtain [N1||n3||IDV||R'||σH']SK'||yK||n2||N1||RK1 by decrypting the ciphertext 
[[N1||n3||IDV||R'||σH']SK'||yK||n2||N1||RK1]KHV. 
Step 14.2: Check the freshness of n2.  If n2 is not fresh, then stop. 
Step 14.3: Compute ID1= H([N1||n3||IDV||R'||σH']SK'||RK1). 
Step 14.4: Store ((ρH, mH, IDH, ID1), RK1, A, L= N1, 1) into its database according to the order of ID1.  
Step 14.5: Transmit ([N1||n3||IDV||R'||σH']SK', IDV) to MU. 
Step 15: MU decrypts HLR’s ciphertext. 
Step 15.1: Get N1||n3||IDV||R'||σH' by decrypting [N1||n3||IDV||R'||σH']SK', where SK'= H(yHx mod p). 
Step 15.2: Check the freshness of N1.  If N1 is not fresh, then stop. 
Step 16: MU validates the promise σH' by checking VH'= h(gVH'yHk'SH' mod p, mH||IDH||yK,new) with the new key 
yK,new.  If VH'= h(gVH'yHk'SH' mod p, mH||IDH||yK,new) then accept; otherwise, reject. 
Step 17: MU sets the new proxy private key as xK,new and the new proxy public key as yK,new for the next round. 
Step 18: MU computes HLR’s Schnorr-like signature ρH'= (sH'= sM'+k' mod q, VH').  
Step 19: MU computes and stores (RK1= H(N1||n2||n3||yK), (h1(n1), h2(n1), h3(n1), …, h(n+1)(n1)), yK, round num-
ber= 1, ID1=H([N1||n3||IDV||R'||σH']SK'||RK1)) into MU’s database. 
When ρH'= (sH', VH') is used, HLR recovers MU’s Schnorr signature ρM'= (sM'=sH'-k' mod q, VM') after obtain-
ing ρH'. 
Subsequent Login Authentication Phase 
VLR authenticates MU repeatedly without contracting HLR in the subsequent login authentication.  Suppose 
that this is ith round subsequent login authentication with the session key RKi, where i≤ n, RKi= H(L, RKi-1), 
RK1= H(N1||n2||n3||yK), and L= H(n-i+2)(n1).  Therefore, the mobile user retrieves the record (RKi, (h1(n1), h2(n1), 
h3(n1), …, h(n+1)(n1)), yK, round number= i) first. 
Step 1: MU transmits (IDi, [h(n-i+1)(n1)]RKi) to VLR. 
Step 2: VLR finds ((ρH, mH, IDH, IDi), RK1, A, L, i) by searching its database according to IDi and obtains h(n-
i+1)(n1) by decrypting [h(n-i+1)(n1)]RKi. 
Step 3: VLR checks whether or not h(h(n-i+1)(n1))= L.  If h(h(n-i+1)(n1))= L, VLR updates L= h(n-i+1)(n1), i= i+1, 
RKi+1= h(L, RKi), and IDi+1= H(IDi||RKi+1) for the next round. 
Step 4: VLR sends [ACK]RKi back to MU, where ACK= h(h
(n-i+1)(n1)||IDi). 
Step 5: MU obtains ACK by decrypting [ACK]RKi and validates ACK by checking whether or not ACK= h(h
(n-
i+1)(n1)||IDi). 
If i= n+1, then MU repeats the login authentication by setting yK= yK,new. 
4. Security Analysis and Proofs 
Our protocol satisfies ten properties: Unlinkability, correctness, fairness, unforgeability, confidentiality, non-
repudiation, mutual authentication, session key security, and user identity privacy, and user unlinkability.  Final-
ly, the assumption of semi-trust HLR is discussed. 
Confidentiality 
Our protocol satisfies IND-CCA2, if there is no PPT adversary α wins the IND-CCA2 game with the non-
negligible probability. 
IND-CCA2 Game 
The game has two participators: Adversary α and Challenger C.  Challenger C controls all oracles that α is al-
lowed to query.  For the un-occurred queries, the hash oracles h and H returns randomly chosen digests and 
stores the query and digest into their databases.  For the occurred queries, the oracles h and H return the digests 
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found in their databases.  The decryption oracle returns decrypted messages for the queried ciphertexts, if the 
ciphertexts are legal. 
The IND-CCA2 game contains the setup, collecting, and challenging and guessing phases.  In the setup phase, 
all systems parameters, public functions, and the public key/private keys of all mobile users are constructed.  
The public parameters and public keys are sent to Adversary.  In the collecting phase, adversary collects his/her 
chosen ciphertexts and the corresponding messages pairs with the help of the decryption oracle.  At the end of 
the collecting phase, Adversary chooses and sends Challenger two messages with the same length.  In the chal-
lenging and guessing phase, challenger gives adversary the challenging ciphertext of one of the two chosen 
messages from adversary.  Adversary is still allowed to collecting the message and ciphertext pairs, where the 
ciphertexts may be chosen by Adversary. 
Adversary finally guesses which message is chosen to generate the challenging ciphertext.  If the guess is cor-
rect, adversary wins the game; otherwise, it loses. 
Theorem 1: Assume the underlying symmetric encryption/decryption scheme is IND-CCA2. Our protocol is 
IND-CCA2 if no PPT algorithm wins the IND-CCA2 game with non-negligible probability based on the DDH 
assumption in the random oracle model. 
Proof of Theorem 1: Consider the DDH instance (ga mod p, gb mod p, gc mod p).  Suppose that a PPT algo-
rithm α wins the IND-CCA2 game, then a PPT DDH-α algorithm is proposed to solve DDH problem with non-
negligible advantage Δ over 1/2. 
Setup Phase 
DDH-α first sets the system parameters p, q, and g.  Then DDH-α generates the private/public key pair (xM, 
yM= gxM mod p) for MU, where xM is a random integer in Zq*.  DDH-α also sets the HLR’s public key yH= ga 
mod p.  DDH-α finally gives Adversary α these system parameters, the public keys yM and yH.  
Collecting Phase 
Adversary α chooses some signcrytexts (CM, SM') and obtains the corresponding message 
mM||Y||IDV||IDM||VM'||yK,new to CM.  The decryption oracle generates the response for the decryption query of (CM, 
SM') as follows. 
Step 1: The decryption oracle first queries the hash oracle H to obtain the session key SK by giving (SM', ⊥).  
The H first searches its database for the query (SM', ⊥).  If some record ((SM'||DH mod p), SK) with par-
tial matching value SM' is found, then H returns SK; otherwise, H randomly chooses a SK and store the 
new record ((SM'||⊥ mod p), SK) into H’s database, where DH is the Diffie-Hellman key of SM' and yH. 
Step 2: The decryption oracle decrypts CM to obtain mM||Y||IDV||IDM||VM'||yK,new||MAC using the session key 
SK.  If one of the identities IDV and IDM are illegal; then the decryption oracle returns illegal response. 
Step 3: The decryption oracle computes MK= H(SK) with the help of H. 
Step 4: The decryption oracle obtains the message digest MAC of (MK, mM||Y||IDV||IDM||VM'||yK,new) by que-
rying H. 
Step 5: The decryption oracle returns that the ciphertext (CM, SM') is illegal if MAC≠ H(MK, 
mM||Y||IDV||IDM||VM'||yK,new||MAC); otherwise the decryption oracle returns the message 
mM||Y||IDV||IDM||VM'||yK,new. 
Step 6: The decryption oracle queries the hash oracle h with the input (SM', yM, mM||IDM,VM').  The oracle h 
searches its database to find the record (SM', yM, mM||IDM,VM") with the partial matched (SM', yM, 
mM||IDM).  If the record is found, the oracle h returns VM"; otherwise, the oracle h returns VM' and stores 
the record (SM', yM, mM||IDM,VM') into its database. 
Step 7: The decryption oracle returns that the ciphertext (CM, SM') is illegal if VM'≠ h(SMyM-VM' mod p, mM||IDM); 
otherwise, returns message mM||Y||IDV||IDM||VM'||yK,new. 
 
Challenging and Guessing Phase 
The adversary chooses and sends two different messages mM||IDV||IDM||yK,1 and mM||IDV||IDM||yK,2 to the 
challenger DDH-α, where yK,1≠ yK,2.  DDH-α generates and sends the challenge (CMβ, SMβ') to α, where (CMβ, 
SMβ') is the signcrytext of mM||Y||IDV||IDM||yK,1 or mM||Y||IDV||IDM||yK,2. 
Step 1: Choose a random value β∈{1, 2}. 
Step 2: Encrypt mM||Yβ||IDV||IDM||yKβ and IDM. 
Step 2.1: Choose a random number x∈Zq* and compute Y= gx mod p. 
Step 2.2: Set SMβ=gb mod p. 
Step 2.3: Choose VMβ randomly and set VMβ =h(SMβyM-VMβ mod p, mM ||IDM ||ykβ) with the help of the oracle h. 
Step 2.4: Compute SK=H(SMβ||gc mod p) with the help of the hash oracle H. 
Step 2.5: Compute MK= H(SK) with the help of H.   
Step 2.6: Compute MAC= H(MK, mM||Y||IDV||IDM||VMβ||yKβ)). 
Step 2.7: Obtain the ciphertext CMβ by encrypting mM||Y||IDV||IDM||VMβ||yKβ and MAC with the key SK. 
Step 3: Send the challenge (CMβ, SMβ') to α. 
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After DDH-α gives the challenge, α is still allowed to collect the other message and signcryptexts.  Finally 
the adversary α outputs the guess β'=1 or 2.  If β'= β, DDH-α returns gab≡gc (mod p), otherwise, DDH-α returns 
gab mod p≠ gc mod p.  If α cannot answer the question over the polynomial-time upper bound of α, DDH-α 
returns gab mod p≠ gc mod p. 
 
Probability analysis 
There are three cases in the probability analysis of DDH-α algorithm. 
Case 1: gab mod p= gc mod p.   
The correct guess β'= β of α means DDH-α returns the correct answer for the DDH instance (ga mod p, gb 
mod p, gc mod p).  Since the winning probability of α is 1/2+Δ, the successful probability of DDH-α is q
Δ+2/1  in 
this case.  On the other hand, the incorrect guess β≠β' of α means that DDH-α also returns the incorrect answer. 
Since the losing probability of α is 1/2-Δ, the failure probability of DDH-α is q
Δ−2/1 . 
Case 2: gab mod p≠ gc mod p with the collision of H. 
Since gab mod p≠ gc mod p, the encryption key SK' is correct only when the collision of hash function H oc-
curs.  The collision probability of hash function H is (1/q).  The output β'=β of α means DDH-α returns the 
incorrect answer of this game.  The failure probability of DDH-α is qq
q Δ+− × 2/11  in this case.  The output β'≠β of 
α means DDH-α returns the correct answer of this game, so the success probability of DDH-α is qq
q Δ−− × 2/11 . 
Case 3: gab mod p≠ gc mod p without the collision of H. 
Without the collision of H and gab mod p≠ gc mod p, the encryption key SK' is incorrect, so the challenge is 
also illegal.  Then, α cannot give its guess during its polynomial-time bound.  After exceeding α’s polynomial-
time bound, DDH-α returns gab mod p≠ gc mod p.  This is successful case of DDH-α with probability 
qq
q Δ−− × 2/11 . 
Thus the total failure probability of DDH-α is qqqq
q
q
1
2
12/11)2/1( )( +<×+ Δ+−Δ− .  Since q is a large prime 
number, the upper bound qq
1
2
1 +  is negligible.  So the failure probability of DDH-α is negligible.  Based on the 
DDH assumption, the proposed protocol is IND-CCA2. 
Unlinkability between the Promise of Signcrytext and HLR’s Ciphertext 
Unlinkability among distinct roaming services means no one can deduce any two distinct roaming services 
belonging to the same MU.  Two cases cause linkability problem.  One case is that adversaries find out the link-
age between ρH' and (CM, SM') from the same MU on two successive roaming.  Since (CM, SM') is the signcryptext 
of the promise σM'= (SM', VM'), the adversary may find out the linkage between ρH' and σM' with the help of the 
linkage between ρH' and (CM, SM'), if the decryption of CM is feasible.  To determine the linkage between ρH' and 
(CM, SM') is at least harder than to explore the linkage between ρH' and σM'.  The linkage problem between ρH' 
and σM' is also the linkage problem in Nguyen’s scheme that is our underlying scheme.  Fortunately, to find the 
linkage is infeasible for the unlinkability of Nguyen’s scheme [12]. 
The other case is to find out the linkage between the promise of signcrytext (CM, SM') and HLR’s ciphertext 
[N1||n3||IDV||R'||σH']SK'.  To show that the linkage find is infeasible, the unlinkability game is defined.  Our pro-
tocol is unlinkabile between the promise of signcrytext (CM, SM') and HLR’s ciphertext [N1||n3||IDV||R'||σH']SK' if 
no polynomial-time adversary α wins the unlinkability game with a non-negligible probability. 
Unlinkability Game between the Promise of Signcrytext and HLR’s Ciphertext 
This game has two participators, the adversary α and the challenger C.  Challenger C controls all hash oracles 
whom α is allowed to query.  These hash oracles are the same as the hash oracles in the security proof of confi-
dentiality. 
This game consists of two phases: Setup, and challenging and guessing phases.  In the setup phase, all sys-
tems parameters, public functions, and the public keys/private keys of all Users are constructed.  The public 
parameters and all public keys are sent to the adversary. 
In the challenging and guessing phase, the adversary first chooses two anonymous public keys that may be-
long to two different MUs to the challenger.  The challenges have two types.  Type 0 is that the challenge con-
sists of two promises of signcryptext using two anonymous public keys and one HLR’s ciphertext for one anon-
ymous public key.  The adversary guesses which the promise matches the HLR’s ciphertext.  Type 1 is that the 
challenge consists of two HLR’s ciphertexts using two anonymous public keys and one promise of signcryptext 
for one anonymous public key.  The adversary guesses that the HLR’s ciphertext matches the promise of sign-
cryptext. 
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Theorem 2: Our protocol provides unlinkablity between the promise of signcrytext and HLR’s ciphertext if no 
PPT algorithm wins the above unlinkability game with non-negligible probability based on the DDH assumption 
in random oracle model. 
Proof of Theorem 2 
Let that the instance of DDH problem be (ga mod p, gb mod p, gc mod p).  Suppose that a PPT algorithm α 
wins the above unlinkability game between the promise of signcrytext and HLR’s ciphertext with advantage Δ 
over 1/2, then an algorithm DDH-α is proposed to solve DDH problem with non-negligible probability. 
Setup Phase 
The challenger DDH-α first adopts p, q, and g as the system parameters and constructs the private/public key 
pair (xM, yM= gxM mod p) of User, where xM is randomly selected in Zq*.   DDH-α sets the public key of HLR yH= 
ga mod p.  Finally, DDH-α gives the adversary α these system parameters, the public keys yM, and yH. 
Challenging and Guessing Phase 
Adversary α produces and gives two anonymous public key pairs of MU yK0 and yK1 to DDH-α.  DDH-α pro-
duces the promises of signcrytexts and HLR’s ciphertexts by the following steps.  Finally, DDH-α gives the 
challenge to α.  The challenge consists of either two promises of User’s Schnorr signcryptexts and one promise 
of HLR’s ciphertext, or one promise of User’s Schnorr signcryptext and two promises of HLR’s ciphertext. 
Step 1: Choose δ, rM0 and rM1∈Zq*. 
Step 2: Obtain VM0= h(g
rM0 mod p, mM||IDM||yK0) and VM1= h(g
rM1 mod p, mM||IDM||yK1) with the help of the 
hash oracle h. 
Step 3: Let Y0= gb mod p and Y1= (gb)δ mod p.  
Step 4: Compute sM0= rM0 +VM0xM mod q and sM1= rM1 +VM1xM mod q. 
Step 5: Compute SM0=g
sM0 mod p and SM1=g
sM1 mod p. 
Step 6: Obtain SK0=H(SM0||yH
sM0mod p) and SK1=H(SM1||yH
sM1mod p). 
Step 7: Obtain MK0=H(SK0) and MK1=H(SK1). 
Step 8: Compute the message digests Dig0= H(MK0, mM||Y0||IDV||IDM||VM0||yK,new) and Dig1=H(MK1, 
mM||Y1||IDV||IDM||VM1||yK,new). 
Step 9: Obtain the ciphertexts CM0= [mM||Y0||IDV||IDM||VM0||yK0||Dig0]SK0 and CM1= 
[mM||Y1||IDV||IDM||VM1||yK1||Dig1]SK1 using the symmetric encryption function. 
Step 10: Choose k0, k1, VH0, and VH1 randomly and compute g
rH0 mod p= yHk0gVH0 mod p and grH1 mod p= yHk1gVH1 
mod p.  
Step 11: Set VH0= h(g
rH0yHsM0 mod p, mH||IDH||yk0) and VH1= h(g
rH1yHsM1 mod p, mH||IDH||yk1) with the help of 
the hash oracle h on the given VH0 and VH1. 
Step 12: Compute SH0= yH
SM0 mod p and SH1= yH
SM1 mod p, then generate SK'0= H(gc mod p) and SK1'= H((gc)δ 
mod p). 
Step 13: Choose (N10, n20, n30, R0) and (N11, n21, n31, R1) randomly, and generate [N10||n20||n30||R0||σH0= (SH0, k0, 
VH0)]SK'0 and [N11||n21||n31||R1||σH1=(SH1, k2, VH1)]SK'1 by the symmetric encryption function. 
Step 14: Choose a random bit β and the type-bit.  If type-bit is 0, give α the challenge CM0, CM1, and 
[N1β||n2β||n3β||Rβ||σHβ=(SHβ, kβ, VHβ)]SK'β; otherwise, give α the challenge CMβ, [N10||n20||n30||R10||σH0]SK'0, 
and [N11||n21||n31||R11||σH1]SK'1 to α. 
On the challenge, the adversary α outputs a bit β'= 0 or 1.  If β'=β, DDH-α returns gab≡ gc (mod p); otherwise, 
DDH-α returns gab mod p≠ gc mod p. 
Probability analysis  
There are three cases in the failure probability analysis of DDH-α algorithm. 
Case 1: gab mod p= gc mod p. 
The incorrect guess β'≠ β of α means DDH-α returns the wrong answer for the DDH instance.  Since the los-
ing probability of α is 1/2-Δ, the failure probability of DDH-α is q
Δ−2/1  for the incorrect guess. 
Case 2: gab mod p≠ gc mod p with the collision of H. 
Since gab mod p≠ gc mod p, the encryption key SK' is correct only when the collision of hash function H oc-
curs.  The collision probability of an ideal hash function H is (1/q).  The correct guess β'= β of α means DDH-α 
returns the incorrect answer of this game, so the failure probability of DDH-α is qq
q Δ+− × 2/11 . 
Case 3: gab mod p≠ gc mod p without the collision of H. 
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Since no collision of H occurs and gab mod p≠ gc mod p, the encryption key SK' is incorrect and the challenge 
is illegal.  The adversary α cannot give its guess during its polynomial-time bound, so DDH-α returns the re-
sponse gab mod p≠ gc mod p.  This is the only successful case of DDH-α with probability q
q
q
q 11 −− × . 
Thus, the total failure probability of DDH-α is )( 2/11)2/1( qq
q
q
Δ+−Δ− ×+ .  Since q is a large prime number and 
qqqq
q
q
1
2
12/11)2/1( )( +<×+ Δ+−Δ− , DDH-α’s failure probability is negligible.  Based on the DDH assumption, our 
protocol satisfies unlinkability between promise of signcrytext and HLR’s ciphertext. 
Fairness 
The fairness in our protocol means that User (HLR) can obtain the HLR’s (User’s) signature but HLR (User) 
cannot.  There are two cases violating the fairness. 
Case 1: Given the promises σM= (SM,VM) satisfying VM= H(SMyM-VM mod p, mM||IDM||yK), HLR generates alone 
the corresponding ρM= (sM,VM) satisfying VM= H(gsMyM-VM mod p, mM||IDM||yK). 
Case 2: Given two promises σM=(SM,VM) and σH=(SH, k, VH) satisfying VM= H(SMyM-VM mod p, mM||IDM||yK) and 
VH=H(gVHyHkSH mod p, mH||IDH||yK), respectively, User obtains ρH=(sH,VH) satisfying VH= H(gVHyHsH mod p, 
mH||IDH||yK) but HLR cannot obtain ρM =(sM,VM) satisfying VM=H(gsMyM-VM mod p, mM||IDM||yK). 
Theorem 3 shows that our protocol is fair. 
Theorem 3: Our protocol is fair since neither Case 1 nor Case 2 occurs based on the discrete logarithm and 
DDH assumption. 
Proof of Theorem 3 
In Case 1, after obtaining σM= (SM,VM), HLR generates alone the valid Schnorr signature ρM= (sM,VM) on the 
message mM||IDM||yK without giving σH.  Fortunately, Case 1 is harder than the forgeability of Schnorr signa-
tures.  Suppose that a polynomial-time adversary can generates the valid Schnorr signature ρM= (sM,VM) on the 
message mM||IDM||yK by giving the promise σM= (SM,VM).  With the help of this adversary, a Schnorr signature 
forging algorithm is stated below.  On the given message m and the public key yM, the forging algorithm easily 
constructs the promise σm= (Sm,Vm) without the signer’s private key xM by the following steps. 
Step 1: Choose rm∈Zq*. 
Step 2: Obtain Vm= h(grm mod p, mm||IDm||yKm), where m= mm||IDm||yKm. 
Step 3: Compute Sm=grmyMVm mod p. 
Step 4: Give the adversary the promise σm= (Sm,Vm) and the message m and obtain the Schnorr signature (sm,Vm) 
from the adversary with non-negligible probability. 
Finally, the forged Schnorr signature (sm,Vm) is obtained.  However, [13-14] show that Schnorr signatures are 
strong against existentially forgery based on the discrete logarithm problem, Case 1 cannot occurs with non-
negligible probability. 
In Case 2, since the legal signature ρM= (sM,VM) satisfies VM= H(gsMyM-VM mod p, mM||IDM||yK), then sM≠ sH-k 
mod q; otherwise, HLR obtains the legal signature ρM= (sM,VM).  For sM≠ sH-k mod q and SH≡ SMxH≡ (gsM)xH 
(mod p), VH= H(gVHyHkSH mod p, mH||IDH||yK)≠ H(gVHyHkg(sH-k)xH mod p, mH||IDH||yK)= H(gVHyHsH mod p, 
mH||IDH||yK).  Since H(gVHyHkSH mod p, mH||IDH||yK)≠ H(gVHyHsH mod p, mH||IDH||yK), gVHyHkSH mod p≠ gVHyHsH 
mod p.  However, H(gVHyHsH mod p, mH||IDH||yK)= VH= H(gVHyHkSH mod p, mH||IDH||yK).  The contradiction 
happens and Case 2 never occurs. 
Unforgeability 
The unforgeability means that both MU’s Schnorr signatures and HLR’s Schnorr-like signatures are unforge-
ability.  Fortunately, User’s Schnorr signatures are existentially unforgeable against chosen-message attacks [13, 
14].  HLR’s Schnorr-like signatures are unforgeability [12]. 
Correctness 
The correctness means that MU obtains the legal HLR’s signature and HLR obtains the legal MU’s signature 
by performing our protocols step by step. 
Theorem 5: In our protocol, MU and HLR can correctly exchange their signature, respectively. 
Proof 
The correctness of the signature exchanges consists of the correctness of the promise of the Schnorr (Schnorr-
like) signature and the correctness of the exchanged Schnorr (Schnorr-like) signature.  On Step 4 in the initiali-
zation phase, HLR validates σM by checking whether or not VM= h(SMyM-VM mod p, mM||IDM||yK).  The verifica-
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tion is correct sine sM= rM+ VMxM mod q, SM= gsM mod p, and VM= h(grM mod p, mM||IDM||yK)= h(gsM-VMxM mod p, 
mM||IDM||yK)= h(gsM(gxM)-VM mod p, mM||IDM||yK)= h(SMyM-VM mod p, mM||IDM||yK).  On Step 7 in the initializa-
tion phase, User validates σH by VH= h(gVHyHkSH mod p, mH||IDH||yK).  This verification is correct since k= (rH- 
VH)xH-1 mod q, and VH= h(grHSH mod p, mH||IDH||yK)= h(gVH+xHkSH mod p, mH||IDH||yK)= h(gVH(gxH)kSH mod p, 
mH||IDH||yK)= h(gVHyHkSH mod p, mH||IDH||yK).  Therefore, the verification of the promises of Schnorr (Schnorr-
like) signatures is correct. 
Consider the correctness of the Schnorr (Schnorr-like) signatures in our protocols.  On Step 6 in the login au-
thentication phase, the Schnorr-like signature, ρH, is validated by VH= h(gVHyHsH mod p, mH||IDH||yK).  This veri-
fication is correct because SH≡ SMxH≡ gsMxH≡ yHsM (mod p), sH= sM+k mod q, and VH= h(gVHyHkSH mod p, 
mH||IDH||yK)= h(gVHyHk+sM mod p, mH||IDH||yK)= h(gVHyHsH mod p, mH||IDH||yK).  On Step 7 in login authentica-
tion phase, HLR validates the Schnorr signature ρM by VM= h(gsMyM-VM mod p, mM||IDM||yK).  The validation is 
correct for VM= h(SMyM-VM mod p, mM||IDM||yK)= h(gsMyM-VM mod p, mM||IDM||yK) and SM= gsM mod p. 
Non-Repudiation 
The non-repudiation in our protocol consists of the HLR’s non-repudiation on the authorization of legal MUs 
and users’ non-repudiation on the roaming service usage.  On Step 5 in the login authentication phase, MU uses 
ρH to convince VLRs that it is the authorized MU.  So the HLR’s non-repudiation on the authorization of MUs 
is based on the non-repudiation on the Schnorr-like signature ρH= (sH, VH) and fairness of our protocol.  Theo-
rem 3 and the non-repudiation of ρH [12] guarantee the HLR’s non-repudiation. 
In the login authentication phase, MU sends the signature A on the anchor N1 of the one-way hash chain 
h1(n1), h2(n1), h3(n1), …, h(n+1)(n1)(= N1) by using the authorized private key xK.  The public key yK is authorized 
HLR and only the MU knows the authorized private key xK, so the MU cannot deny the signature A on the an-
chor N1.  Because the one-way property of hash functions, the one can give the hash value hi(n1) is the signer of 
the signature A.  Therefore, the non-repudiation of MU’s roaming services usage is based on the unforgability of 
the signature A and the one-way property of h. 
Session Key Security 
The first session key RK1 is secure.  The ciphertext [[N1||n3||IDV||R'||σH']SK'||yK||n2||N1||RK1]KHV contains RK1 
and the ciphertext [N1||n3||IDV||R'||σH']SK'.  Since the underlying symmetric cipher is the IND-CCA2, no one 
obtains RK1 from the ciphertext [[N1||n3||IDV||R'||σH']SK'||yK||n2||N1||RK1]KHV.  Since the first session key RK1= 
H(N1||n2||n3||yK), the security of RK1 is based on the confidentiality of the secret random number n3 generated by 
HLR.  Fortunately, the underlying symmetric cipher is the IND-CCA2 secure, only the designated MU can ob-
tain the secret random number n3 to compute RK1. 
Additionally, the subsequent session keys are also secure.  For the IND-CCA2 symmetric cipher assumption, 
the ciphertext [h(n-i+1)(n1)]RKi leaks nothing about the session key RKi and the message h
(n-i+1)(n1).   No one derives 
RKi+1= h(L, RKi) for both L and RKi are secret.  Thus, the protocol provides the session key security property. 
Mutual Authentication  
Our protocol provides the mutual authentication property between MU and VLR, VLR and HLR, and MU 
and HLR, respectively. 
Mutual Authentication between MU and VLR 
The mutual authentication between MU and VLR consists of login mutual authentication and subsequent log-
in mutual authentication.  On Step 6 in login authentication processes, VLR authenticates MU by validating ρH= 
(sH, VH) with VH= h(gVHyHsH mod p, mH||IDH||yK) and HLR’s public key yH.  If ρH is valid, VLR is convinced that 
MU is some HLR’s anonymous legal mobile user.  MU adopts the random number N1 to authenticate VLR with 
the help of HLR.  On Step 8 in the one-line authentication phase, MU sends VLR the challenge N1.  On Step 9, 
the ciphertext [N1||n2||yK||(CM,SM')||ρH||Dig]KHV is used to convince HLR that the VLR specified by MU has the 
fresh challenge N1 because KHV is the shared secret key between HLR and VLR and (CM,SM') is the signcryptext 
from MU.  On Step 15.3, the ciphertext [N1||n3||IDV||R'||σH']SK' is used as the HLR guarantee that the intended 
VLR actually receives N1 sent on Step 8.  Therefore, MU authenticates VLR with the help of HLR. 
The subsequent login mutual authentication between MU and VLR is based on the share secret key RKi.  On 
Step 3 in subsequent login processes, after decrypting the authentication messages from MU by using RKi,  VLR 
authenticates MU by checking whether or not h(h(n-i+1)(n1))= L. 
Mutual Authentication between VLR and HLR 
The mutual authentication between VLR and HLR is based on the secret long-term key KHV.  On the Step 4.3 
in login authentication processes, MU tells HLR who the intended VLR is by using the signcryptext CM contain-
Hwang and You: A Unlinkable Delegation-based Authentication Protocol with Users’ Non-repudiation 
 
45 
ing the intended VLR’s identity IDV.  On the Step 9, VLR transmits [N1||n2||yK||(CM,SM')||ρH||Dig]KHV to HLR.  
After decrypting the ciphertext [N1||n2||yK||(CM,SM')||ρH||Dig]KHV, HLR authenticates who the VLR is because 
only VLR and HLR know the long-term key KHV.  On Step 12.4, after decrypting and validating the signcryptext 
(CM,SM'), HLR actually check whether the IDV decrypted from CM is consistent with the current VLR’s identity.  
If it is consistent, HLR authenticates VLR. 
After decrypting the ciphertext [[N1||n3||IDV||R'||σH']SK'||yK||n2||N1||RK1]KHV from HLR, VLR checks the 
freshness of n2.  If n2 is the same as he/she sent on Step 9, VLR authenticates HLR since KHV is the shared secret 
key between HLR and VLR. 
Mutual Authentication between MU and HLR 
In login authentication processes, HLR authenticates MU based on the fact that only the MU knows the pri-
vate key xK.  After validating ρH, HLR recovers ρM to guarantee that only the MU actually knows xK.  After 
checking the signature A, HLR confirms that the specified MU is the one knowing xK. 
The MU authenticates HLR by the Diffie-Hellman key YxH mod P.  After decrypting the correct message 
from the ciphertext [N1||n3||IDV||R'||σH']SK' and checking the freshness of N1 and n3, MU authenticates the identi-
ty of HLR.  The reason is that only HLR and the one choosing Y can compute SK'= H(YxH mod p). 
User Identity Privacy  
User identity privacy means during the roaming services, no one, except HLR, can obtain MU’s real identity 
IDM.  In our protocol, only the signcryptext CM contains IDM, the confidentiality protects MU’s identity.  Fortu-
nately, Theorem 1 shows that our protocol also provides IND-CCA2, CM releases nothings about IDM.  In the 
login authentication phase, MU adopts anonymous public key yK to hide the actual identity.  In the subsequent 
login authentication phase, MU adopts aliases, IDi’s, on the communications with VLR.  Hence, our protocol 
provides the user identity privacy. 
User Unlinkability 
Moreover, the proxy public key yK is updated with yK,new after finishing each login authentication process.  
For an adversary, it is hard to determine whether two instances belong to the same MU by linking proxy public 
keys.  Moreover, during the subsequent login communication between MU and VLR, different aliases, IDi’s, are 
used for different communications.  So, our protocol provides the unlinkable identities protection. 
5. Comparison and Discussions 
Table 1 shows the security property comparison among Youn and Lim, Chen et al., and our protocols.  The 
major contribution of our protocol is to reduce the trust HLR assumption to enhance the non-repudiation proper-
ty for MUs.  In both Youn and Lim’s and Chen et al.’s protocols, the HLR must be trust completely, because 
HLR knows MU’s proxy private key.  Both MU and HLR shares the user’s proxy private key, so users’ non-
repudiation is completely based on HLR’s trust.  However, this assumption is impractical and allows HLR to 
damage MUs’ benefit by forging any roaming records. 
To enhance the users’ non-repudiation by reducing trust HLR assumption, in our protocol, only MU knows 
his/her proxy private key xK.  To show the proxy authorization on the proxy key yK and provide MUs’ anonymi-
ty protection, the anonymous concurrent signcryption scheme to exchange the promise σH of ρH= (sH, VH) of 
HLR and the promise σM of ρM= (sM, VM) of MU.  After exchanging the promises of signatures, MU first obtains 
the Schnorr-like signature ρH= (sH, VH) of HLR as the authentication message.  HLR cannot obtain he Schnorr 
signature ρM= (sM, VM) until MU uses the Schnorr-like signature ρH= (sH, VH).  After obtaining ρH= (sH, VH) from 
MU, HLR also obtains the evidence ρM= (sM, VM) to show that MU actually applies the proxy public key yK.  The 
evidence ρM is used to not only protect the HLR’s right but also enhance the MUs’ non-repudiation by reducing 
trust HLR assumption.  Therefore, the non-repudiation of our protocol is stronger than the non-repudiation both 
in Youn and Lim, and Chen et al. protocols. 
Both our and Chen et al.’s protocols avoid the exhausted search problem during the subsequent login authen-
tication.  In our protocol, after receiving (IDi, [h(n-i+1)(n1)]RKi) from MU in subsequent login authentication pro-
cesses, the alias IDi helps VLR easily find the session key RKi to decrypt the ciphtertext [h(n-i+1)(n1)]RKi.  Unfor-
tunately, Youn and Lim’s protocol suffers the exhausted search problem during the subsequent login authentica-
tion. 
Both our and Chen et al.’s protocols provide not only the first login but also subsequent login MU unlinkabil-
ity to authenticate anonymous MUs.  In the subsequent login authentication in our or Chen et al.’s protocols, 
MU submits different aliases IDi’s to login VLR, so the subsequent login users’ unlinkability is provided.  How-
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ever, in the subsequent login authentication in Youn and Lim’s protocol, the anonymous MU has no chance to 
change the alias, so their protocol does not provide the subsequent login user unlinkability. 
Moreover, in our protocol, the anonymous concurrent signcryption scheme is also proposed.  The anonymous 
concurrent signcryption scheme satisfies the correctness, unlinkability, fairness, unforgability, and IND-CCA2 
confidentiality properties.  Among those properties, the fairness property is useful to protect MU’s and HLR’s 
benefits in the delegation-based authentication protocol for PCSs.  The users’ benefit is protected since only the 
delegated MU knows the proxy private key.  The HLR’s benefit is protected since HLR obtains the evidence 
ρM= (sM, VM) only after the MU actually uses the proxy public key and the Schnorr-like signature ρH= (sH, 
VH).  By using ρM = (sM, VM), the HLR really proves that the proxy public key is actually form the MU. 
 
Table 1: Security Property Comparison among Youn and Lim, Chen et al., and Our Protocols 
        Protocols  
Property 
Youn and Lim Chen et al. Our protocol 
Non-repudiation Yes with Trust HLR Yes with Trust HLR Yes with Semi-Trust 
HLR 
Mutual authentication Yes Yes Yes 
Session key security  Yes Yes Yes 
User identity privacy Yes Yes Yes 
User unlinkability On-line On-line/subsequent login On-line/subsequent login 
No exhausted search No Yes Yes 
Semi-trust HLR No No Yes 
Unlinkability  N/A N/A Yes 
Correctness  N/A N/A Yes 
Fairness N/A N/A Yes 
Unforgeability  N/A N/A Yes 
Confidentiality N/A N/A Yes 
 
6. Conclusions 
By utilizing our concurrent signcryption scheme, the trust HLR assumption is reduced to the semi-trust HLR 
assumption in our new protocol.  Consequently, the users’ non-repudiation is enhanced.  Moreover, the perfor-
mance of the subsequent login authentication is improved by removing the exhaustive search problem when 
VLR has to find the alias of an anonymous MU.  Since the mobile user adopts different aliases to login VLR in 
subsequent login authentication every time, our protocol supposes the subsequent login user’s unlinkability to 
protect the user identity privacy.  The concurrent signcryption scheme also supposes the fairness property to 
fairly protect mobile users’ and HLR’s benefits. 
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